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Binding Certificates to Service Accounts Deployed on Zero-Trust Cloud Virtual Machines 
ABSTRACT 
Zero-trust architecture is based on the assumption that none of the entities within the 
architecture are trusted implicitly based on their properties; explicit authentication and 
authorization based on certificates take place prior to establishing a session with the resource. 
However, there is no mechanism to monitor and enforce the distribution of certificates based on 
cloud-based service accounts. This disclosure describes techniques to bind a certificate policy to 
a service account that enables enforcement of specific policies on a virtual machine based on the 
particular service account associated with that virtual machine. The mapping between a 
certificate policy and the corresponding service account in the installed certificate is used to 
validate compliance with the policy. A mismatch between the policy in the presented certificate 
and the expected policy triggers an event that signals a potentially compromised virtual machine. 
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BACKGROUND 
Zero-trust architecture is commonly used for secure deployment of computing resources, 
whether in the cloud or in other computing infrastructure. Deployment of resources in a zero-
trust architecture requires appropriate configuration of endpoints, applications, networks, 
infrastructure, and data. Such configuration is based on the assumption that none of the entities 
within the architecture are trusted implicitly based on one or more of their properties, such as 
location, network, ownership, etc. Instead, explicit authentication and authorization take place 
prior to establishing a session with the resource. 
In the context of Virtual Privacy Cloud (VPC) networks, mutual Transport Layer 
Security (mTLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) inspection are methods that can be used 
effectively to maintain encryption while ensuring that the network is protected under the zero-
trust model mentioned above. For instance, mTLS sessions are established based on certificates 
installed on virtual machines or any other compute services, such as containers. These 
certificates identify the machine on which they are installed, thus helping ensure the security of 
the established TLS connection. Currently, network administrators can issue certificates that 
specify particular policies, such as “the organization must be X.”  
In addition to virtual machines, network identities can be used to create a virtual network 
segmentation in which machines that use the same service account can communicate with each 
other. A service account is an identity based on a virtual machine that exists only in the cloud 
environment. It represents policies and permissions assigned to the virtual machine. However, 




Defensive Publications Series, Art. 4734 [2021]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/4734
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques to bind a certificate policy to a service account in 
order to enable network administrators to enforce specific policies on a virtual machine based on 
the particular service account associated with that virtual machine. The mapping between a 
certificate policy and the corresponding service account in the installed certificate is used to 
validate compliance with the policy as presented to the Certificate Authority (CA) service. 
The CA can employ various mechanisms to validate the integrity of the deployed 
certificates. For example, such mechanisms can include: periodically probing each virtual 
machine in the designated network to present a certificate; deploying virtual machines to perform 
packet mirroring such that each certificate presented by the virtual machine is mirrored to the CA 
for inspection; etc.  
The CA compares the policy in the presented certificate against that on the record for the 
corresponding service account. A mismatch between the policy in the presented certificate and 
the expected policy results in the triggering of an event that signals a potentially compromised 
virtual machine. The triggered event can be used to take appropriate automated or manual action 
in response to the potential compromise. 
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Fig. 1: Binding certificates to service accounts connected to virtual machines in the cloud 
Fig. 1 shows an example of operational implementation of the techniques described in 
this disclosure. Two types of service accounts, Service Account 1 (102) and Service Account 2 
(104) are provided with virtual machines (106) within a subnet (108) of a cloud platform (110). 
A private certificate authority for the cloud (112) is employed to generate certificates (114) such 
that specific certification parameters, such as name, lifetime, domain name, etc. are limited to the 
specific service account connected to the virtual machine on which the certificate is deployed. 
For example, Fig. 1 shows the certificate for Service Account 1 in purple and the one for Service 
Account 2 in orange. 
Network administrators can use this approach to create granular segmentation within a 
subnet based on certificate identities connected to service accounts. Even if an adversary 
succeeds in compromising a virtual machine to obtain escalated privileges and modify the 
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certificate installed on the compromised virtual machine, the attack does not succeed because the 
modified certificate causes a mismatch thus revealing the (potentially) compromised status of the 
virtual machine. 
Techniques described in this disclosure provide built-in enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure the integrity of certificates deployed on virtual machines. The centralized cloud-based 
approach can be employed to verify certificates and enforce policies at scale across multiple 
projects and subnets. Such ability to handle scale is particularly important for zero-trust 
architectures in which each machine and service account must authenticate prior to establishing a 
session and exchanging data. The techniques described in this disclosure can be used by any 
platform or service that provides cloud-based virtual machines and service accounts. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes techniques to bind a certificate policy to a service account that 
enables enforcement of specific policies on a virtual machine based on the particular service 
account associated with that virtual machine. The mapping between a certificate policy and the 
corresponding service account in the installed certificate is used to validate compliance with the 
policy. A mismatch between the policy in the presented certificate and the expected policy 
triggers an event that signals a potentially compromised virtual machine. 
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